)>IJH=?J In an industry characterised by secret vertical contracts, we consider a benchmark case where two vertical chains exist, with two upstream manufacturers selling to two downstream retailers, and show that the equilibrium prices are independent of whether upstream or downstream¯rms have all the bargaining power. We then analyse two alternative mergers, and show that a downstream merger (which gives the downstream monopolist all the bargaining power) is more welfare detrimental than an upstream merger (which gives the bargaining power to the upstream monopolist). We also show that downstream and upstream mergers have the same
Introduction
The study of vertical contracts is probably one of the most interesting areas of research in the recent industrial organisation literature. However, most of the studies assume that it is the upstream¯rms (or manufacturers) which have the bargaining power, and can make take-it-or-leave-it o®ers to the downstream¯rms (or retailers)
. In general, economists have presumed that concentration is higher among the manufacturers than among the retailers, and that entry in the retailing sector is characterised by few barriers, so that perfect competition and/or free entry in the retail sector would not be seen as too strong assumptions. Yet, this perspective was probably more justi¯ed in the past than in recent times, given the rising market concentration at the retailers' level, as for instance the success of large supermarket chains in many countries would suggest.
The few existing data witness the impressive rise in concentration among retailers. In the UK, the number of grocery retail outlets fell from over 140,000 in 1960 to below 40,000 in 1997, with 2% of the stores controlling 47% of grocery sales (Dobson and Waterson, 1999, pp. 136-139) . Similar evolution in retailer concentration has occurred in all the western economies. Even in Italy, which together with Greece has the lowest level of retail concentration in Europe (the top 5 retail¯rms had 11% of sales in 1997, whereas France and Germany had 31%, the UK 30%, Belgium 43% and Finland 72%) ! , there are clear signs that retail concentration is increasing. For instance, the number of food stores were 339,400 in 1983 but only 287,000 ten years later (Dobson and Waterson, 1999, pp. 139-140 ).
This development calls for more research on the analysis of vertical contracts under the hypothesis that retailers are the \strong side" of the vertical structure. There are recent studies which have moved in this direction. For instance, Sha®er (1991) considers the case of imperfectly competitive retailers which have the bargaining power and can choose among the o®ers that many producers make. He analyzes observable contracts and¯nds that downstream¯rms o®er vertical contracts to their suppliers aimed at reducing competition in the product market. This type of strategic contracts is also used by manufacturers when they have the bargaining power " . Hart and Tirole (1990) , O'Brien and Sha®er (1992) , McAfee and Schwartz (1993) , and Rey and Tirole (1996) introduce secret (or unobservable) contracts in a setting in which an upstream monopolist sells to many retailers. They show that unobservability of contracts gives room for opportunisMost of the classical papers in the literature present this feature, from the seminal paper of Telser (1960) , Spengler (1950) to more recent papers as Mathewson and Winter (1984) , Bonanno and Vickers (1988) , Stiglitz (1988 and 1995) .
At the¯rm level, the top 5 grocers in the UK had in 1996 64% of national market share, up from 53% just 8 years before.
! When considering buyer groups (that is, groups in which two or more retailers join forces to purchase together so as to enhance their bargaining power with respect to manufacturers) instead of retail¯rms, concentration¯gures are even more impressive.
" See for instance Bonanno and Vickers (1988) , Stiglitz (1988, 1995) , Gal{Or (1991), Lin (1988) and the survey by Irmen (1998) .
tic behaviour of the upstream producer and prevents it from achieving the monopoly outcome. Instead, a downstream monopolist buying from many manufacturers does not su®er from this commitment problem, which leads to higher market power in the latter than in the former case. O'Brien and Sha®er (1992) show that the commitment problem faced by the upstream monopolist exists for di®erent distribution of the bargaining power between manufacturer and retailers.
In this paper, we build on the previous literature, and especially the Rey and Tirole (1996)'s paper, to study whether upstream or downstream mergers are the more likely to have an adverse impact on welfare. To do so, we¯rst construct a pre-merger case where two upstream¯rms supply two downstream¯rms. The equilibrium outcome of such a situation, with two duopolistic vertical chains (where vertical contracts consist of nonlinear pricing schemes, or franchise fee contracts), is the same independently of whether the bargaining power is upstream or downstream, thus providing a useful benchmark case from which mergers at the two di®erent stages of the production process can be analysed. We then carry out a comparative statics analysis, as follows. We study how the equilibrium outcome changes if,¯rst, the two upstream¯rms merge (thus getting all the bargaining power in the negotiation with the two retailers, a reasonable assumption); and, second, if the two downstream¯rms merge (and get all the bargaining power). Wē nd that downstream mergers are more likely to be welfare reducing than upstream mergers.
In section 2, the main section of the paper, we analyse the case of unobservable contracts (that is, contracts agreed between a retailer and its supplier cannot be seen by the other agents in the economy) under the assumption that retailers compete in prices (with di®erentiated goods). We¯nd that a downstream merger leads to higher market prices and lower welfare, whereas an upstream merger would a®ect neither prices nor welfare with respect to our benchmark situation, the duopolistic vertical chain case. In this sense, downstream mergers are more`dangerous' than upstream mergers. Our result builds on the following intuition (see also Rey and Tirole (1996) ). An upstream monopolist which o®ers unobservable contracts would su®er from a lack of commitment power. Similarly to a durable good monopolist, an upstream monopolist has an incentive for opportunistic behaviour. A durable good monopolist is not able to impose monopoly prices because consumers know that in the following period he would have an incentive to reduce prices to get additional demand; likewise, an upstream monopolist who is not able to commit to a certain and observable contract, is not able to impose monopoly prices because retailers know that after having signed a supply contract with them, the monopolist has an incentive to negotiate a price reduction with the other retailers in order to increase¯nal demand. Because of this lack of commitment, the upstream monopolist would not be able to exploit its monopoly power # .
# Of course, in the same way as a durable good monopolist might be able to overcome its lack of commitment power through leasing, building of a reputation, most-favoured-customers clauses and other mechanisms, Rey and Tirole (1996) show that an upstream¯rm might be able to restore its monopoly power through resale price maintenance, exclusive dealings and other vertical contracts. In
Instead, a downstream¯rm would not su®er from any such lack of commitment e®ect. Since it sells directly to consumers, it does not have an incentive to change the terms of the contracts negotiated with the upstream suppliers, and it would be able to reap all the monopoly pro¯ts at equilibrium.
In section 3, we keep the assumption of unobservable contracts and we show that the same results hold even if retailers would compete in quantities rather than in prices. A downstream merger would lead to monopoly prices and welfare losses, while an upstream merger would not.
In section 4, we brie°y review how the results would change if contracts were observable. In such a case, vertical contracts in the duopolistic case would have a precommitment value and can be exploited for strategic reasons. Again, the case where there are two vertical chains would provide a common benchmark case, since both upstream and downstream¯rms will have the same incentive to distort the contract to relax product market competition. However, in this case, both upstream and downstream mergers would have the same adverse e®ect on competition. Indeed, when contracts are observable, an upstream monopolist would have no incentive to renegotiate a contract with a retailer, and would then be able to fully exploit its monopoly power. Since most of the arguments in this section are relatively familiar in the literature on vertical restraints, we shall keep the formalisation to a minimum and just brie°y present the main results and the main intuitions behind them.
After this short introduction, we can summarise the objectives of the present paper as follows. First of all, we would like to stress the often disregarded adverse e®ects of market concentration in the retail sector. Further, we have two more divulgative purposes. The¯rst is to make the reader acquainted with a recent literature (on unobservable vertical contracts) which has important policy implications (see the discussions in Rey and Tirole, 1996) $ . The second is to brie°y review the literature on vertical restraints (and especially its strategic e®ects) in the presence of observable contracts, reminding the reader of its main results.
Unobservable contracts: Price competition
We consider an industry in which there are two manufacturers or upstream¯rms (U ; U ) ; each of them stipulates an exclusive contract with a retailer or downstream¯rm (D ; D ) : this paper, we assume away such contracts, but the reader should be aware that if such contracts are available, then an upstream merger would result in the same adverse competitive e®ects as a downstream merger.
$ One of the implications of this analysis is that regulators should reduce the presence of market power at the vertical stage closest to¯nal consumers. This has led the UK electricity regulator to create intermediary agents between the companies active in the distribution of electricity and the¯nal users.
At the distribution level, the electricity market is highly concentrated, and by obliging the companies to sell through intermediaries, the regulator hopes to create a commitment problem which will result in lower¯nal prices. We are grateful to Natalia Fabra for bringing this case to our attention.
All¯rms are assumed to operate at constant return to scale. For simplicity, we assume that U and U produce at the same constant marginal cost c and that the downstream¯rms (D ; D ) transform the intermediate product into the¯nal one on a one-for-one basis and at zero marginal cost.
We assume that contracts stipulated by a producer and a downstream¯rm remain unobserved by the rival upstream and downstream¯rms (see section 4 for the case of observable contracts). In this section, we also assume that each chain produces a di®erent nal good and that downstream competition is in prices (see section 3 for the case where downstream retailers compete in quantities). We will analyze the equilibrium prices and pro¯ts arising before and after a merger occuring either in the upstream sector or in the downstream one.
Let p i be the¯nal price of good i; with i = 1; 2: Goods are substitutes, and demand for each good is decreasing, concave in its own price and symmetric % :
We¯rst consider the case in which the upstream¯rms possess all the bargaining power in the negotiation process with the downstream¯rms. The implicit assumption is that there is a competitive supply of potential downstream¯rms such that an upstream producer can capture the whole downstream surplus without terminating the relationship. In this setting we compare the equilibria arising before and after a merger between the upstream producers.
Upstream bargaining power 2.1.1 The pre-merger case
The interaction between the two¯rms is modelled as follows:
2. in the second stage the two downstream¯rms simultaneously set their prices p i and p j and then order the quantities of the intermediate good to satisfy demand. Given the tari® T i (q i ), the downstream¯rm D i payo® function is given by:
and the¯rst order condition is:
We denote with p i = p i (w i ; p j ) the best reply function of downstream¯rm i obtained from equation (4).
Notice that, being contracts unobservable, the best reply does not depend on the wholesale price established by the other upstream producer. In other words, the upstream producer expects that only the price of its own downstream¯rm responds to changes in its wholesale price (this would not be the case under observable contracts, see section 4). Therefore, there is no commitment e®ect and the game is played as if p = (p i ; p j ) and w = (w i ; w j ) were determined simultaneously and not sequentially. In particular, since the franchise fee F F i can be used to extract the whole downstream surplus, it will amount to:
Therefore, the upstream¯rm i chooses w i to maximize:
The¯rst order condition is given by:
Given (4), equation (7) is satis¯ed i®:
In other words, the unobservability of contracts eliminates any strategic e®ect associated with the choice of the wholesale price and, for any w j charged by the rival manufacturer, the best reply of producer i is to set the wholesale price equal to marginal cost. This implies that the payo® of the upstream¯rm coincides with the one that derives from the direct maximization of (p i ¡ c) D i (p) : Therefore, if contracts are unobservable, an upstream¯rm is indi®erent between stipulating an exclusive contract with a downstream¯rm and integrating vertically.
Notice that we have assumed that each upstream¯rm chooses a two-part tari® (or franchise fee) contract. It can be shown that this is indeed always an equilibrium outcome & .
In equilibrium each manufacturer choses w i = w j = c and the¯nal prices result as the solution to:
The¯rst order conditions is:
The symmetric equilibrium prices p
where " is the direct price elasticity of demand evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium prices and where the label \b" stands for the \Bertrand" solution (but recall that here retailers are selling di®erentiated goods, so that p b does not equal marginal costs at equilibrium).
The pro¯ts of each upstream producers are ¼
In other words, when there are two vertical chains, contracts are unobservable and product market competition is in prices, the equilibrium price is the same as when two manufacturers sell directly to¯nal consumers.
Upstream merger
Let us now analyse the case where the upstream producers merge. The industry is now characterized by an upstream monopolist and by two downstream¯rms ' . The timing of the game is the same, with U secretly o®ering each
& See Rey and Stiglitz (1995) . They study the game (under a simple linear demand function) where upstream¯rms choose in the¯rst stage whether to o®er a two-part tari® or a linear pricing contract, the other stages being as before. Unless the two goods are very close substitutes, both¯rms o®ering a two-part tari® is the only Nash Equilibrium of the contract game. When products are very close substitutes, both contracts arise as a Nash Equilibrium of the game. The intuition is that adopting a linear tari® the producer necessarily choses a wholesale price higher than the marginal cost, even if contracts are unobservable and no strategic e®ect is at work. This softens downstream competition and, if the two goods are close substitutes so that the retailer's margin is not relevant and the double marginalization e®ect is not too strong, the pro¯ts of the upstream producer are higher imposing a linear tari® than a two-part tari®.
' The monopolist might wish to keep both retailers because they o®er di®erentiated services or are located in di®erent locations.
Let us de¯ne p m 1 = p m 2 = p m the prices that maximize total pro¯ts:
These prices satisfy:
Given our assumption that contracts are unobservable, it is easy to see that the upstream monopolist is not able to achieve monopoly pro¯ts. To see this, imagine that it makes the following take-it-or-leave-it o®er: T i : To see this point more precisely, write the joint pro¯t of U and D j as:
The¯rst order condition with respect to p j is:
Recalling that p m satisi¯es condition (12) and the assumptions made on demand, at the joint-maximizing retail price the previous expression is negative:
This implies that, assuming that the objective function is quasi-concave, the supplier and retailer j will negotiate a contract that induces a retail price cut, if retailer i
Notice that, since retailers order quantities of the intermediate good after learning sales, granting a secret price-cut to a retailer could back¯re on the monopolist: the recipient would cut its output price, reducing demand of the other retailer's output and hence its intermediate good order. In spite of this feedback e®ect, which does not exist when orders are placed before demand is realized 11 , the monopolist has an incentive to Hence, the loss of the monopolist from lower sales through the injured retailer is less than it would be under joint-maximization and U has an incentive to induce p j < p m given p i = p m :
In the case of secret contracts, the contracts actually o®ered in equilibrium depend on the nature of each downstream¯rm's conjectures about the contract o®ered to its rival. Therefore 
Therefore, the FOC for maximizing (16) with respect to w i taking p j¤ as given is: (18) and (17), we obtain the following condition:
The previous system of two equations with two unknowns is satis¯ed only by w For a complete discussion of why passive conjectures are plausible, see Rey and Tirole (1996) .
! Without loss of generality because the franchise fee enables 7 to extract , E I pro¯t and the choice of the wholesale price su±ces to control the downstream unit's quantity choice.
Therefore, for passive conjectures, the equilibrium wholesale price equals marginal cost and the unique equilibrium yields
Since the upstream producer posess all the bargaining power, the franchise fees absorbes the downstream surplus and the upstream¯rm's pro¯t is:
To conclude, when contracts are secret the upstream merger has no impact on consumers while the merging¯rms obtain exactly the sum of the pre-merger pro¯ts " . In other words their pro¯ts do not increase as a consequence of their increased market power. This is because of the lack of commitment problem we have explained above.
Downstream bargaining power
In this section we assume that the downstream¯rms posess all the bargaining power and we compare the equilibrium arising before and after a merger occuring downstream.
The pre{merger case
The only di®erence with respect to the previous setting is that in the¯rst stage each D i secretly o®ers U i a tari® T (q i ) = w i q i + F F i :
A retailer D i can use the franchise fee F F i (in this case the fee is negative: it is a slotting allowances) to extract the whole upstream surplus (F F i = ¡ (w i ¡ c) D i (p i ; p j )) and choses w i to maximize its pro¯t:
where p i (w i ; p j ) is D i s best reply in the downstream game and satis¯es condition (4). Since contracts are unobservable, D i knows that the other downstream¯rm does not react to a change in its wholesale price and it has no incentive to precommit to a wholesale price higher than marginal cost, with the strategic purpose to soften downstream competition. Therefore, the FOC of D i s maximization problem is:
Taking into account that p i (w i ; p j ) satis¯es (4), equation (21) In equilibrium each downstream¯rm chooses w i = w j = c and the equilibrium¯nal goods price and pro¯ts are:
which are exactly the same solutions as in the case of duopolistic vertical chains with upstream bargaining power.
Downstream merger
When the downstream producers merge, the industry will be characterized by two upstream¯rms serving a downstream producer. Since D directly faces the¯nal market, the inability of the monopolist to exert fully its monopoly power does not appear. D can make a take-it or leave-it o®er to U and U imposing them to sell their input at the marginal cost c: This implies that D manages to charge to¯nal consumers the prices that maximize its aggregate pro¯t:
In equilibrium, p
Therefore, di®erently from an upstream merger, a downstream merger decreases the welfare of consumers and increases the pro¯ts of the merging¯rms, relative to the premerger situation. This suggests that competition authorities should put extra caution before allowing merger proposals by¯rms operating in the retail or distribution sectors.
# Notice that the downstream¯rms cannot do better using linear pricing: also in such a case they would choose w E = c:
Homogeneous goods (Cournot Competition)
In this section we prove that the results obtained still hold goods when assuming that the¯nal product is homogeneous and that downstream producers compete in quantities. The inverse demand is decreasing and concave: p = P (Q) : As before, we¯rst consider the case of upstream bargaining power (and upstream merger) and then the case of downstream bargaining power (and downstream merger).
Upstream Bargaining Power

The pre-merger case
The interaction between the two¯rms is modelled as follows: The downstream¯rm's payo® is given by:
Equation (24) de¯nes D i s reply function q i = q i (w i ; q j ). The upstream¯rm U i can use the franchise fee to extract all the downstream¯rm's pro¯t and, for a given w j it maximizes:
Given (24), equation (26) is satis¯ed i® w i = c:
As in the previous section, for any w j charged by the rival manufacturer, the best reply of producer i is to set the wholesale price equal to marginal cost. This implies that the payo® of the upstream¯rm coincides with the one that derives from the direct maximization of [P (q i + q j ) ¡ c] q i : Therefore, if contracts are unobservable, an upstream rm is indi®erent between stipulating an exclusive contract with a downstream¯rm and integrating vertically.
In equilibrium each manufacturer choses w i = w j = c and the Nash equilibrium quantities (denoted with the label \c" which stands for Cournot) are the solution to:
In the symmetric equilibrium, q
Upstream merger
Consider the case where the industry is characterized by an upstream monopolist and by two downstream¯rms. The timing of the game is unaltered.
Let us de¯ne p m and Q m the solution of the maximization of
and ¼ m the monopoly pro¯ts.
Similarly to the case of price competition, given that contracts are not observable, the monopolist cannot fully exert its monopoly power and gets the monopoly pro¯ts. 
From the¯rst order condition, the optimal amount of intermediate good that retailer j should be induced to order, q j = q j (q i ; c) ; satis¯es:
Since P (Q) is assumed to be decreasing and concave, Since the franchise fee is used to absorbe the downstream surplus, w i is chosen in order to maximize: The FOC of this maximization problem is:
Combining (24) and (32) we obtain the following conditions:
The previous system is satis¯ed by w
The intuition behind this result is tha passive beliefs imply that a retailer's decision about downstream output is not a®ected by unobserved changes in the wholesale prices to rivals. Therefore, in its dealing with any retailer, the monopolist acts as if the two are integrated and face a given residual downstream demand. Maximization involves setting wholesale price equal to the monopolist marginal cost.
Hence, under passive conjectures, the equilibrium quantities are the ones arising before the merger:
The pro¯t of the upstream producer is:
To conclude, when contracts are secret the upstream merger has no impact on consumers while the merging¯rms obtain exactly the sum of the pre-merger pro¯ts. $ Hart and Tirole (1990) show that the same outcome emerges when the monopolist can employ more general contracts than two-part tari®s. The downstream¯rm D i can use the franchise fee (slotting allowances, in this case) to extract all the upstream¯rm's pro¯t (F F i = ¡ (w i ¡ c) q i ) and, for a given w j it maximizes:
where q i (w i ; q j ) satis¯es condition (24).
The¯rst order condition of D i s maximization problem is given by:
Given (24), equation (35) is satis¯ed i® w i = c: In other words, for any w j charged by the rival manufacturer, the best reply of producer i is to set the wholesale price equal to marginal cost. This implies that the upstream¯rm maximizes [P (q i + q j ) ¡ c] q i : Therefore, if contracts are unobservable, an upstream¯rm is indi®erent between stipulating an exclusive contract with a downstream rm and integrating vertically.
In equilibrium each manufacturer choses w i = w j = c and symmetric Nash equilibrium quantities and pro¯ts are q c = q c = q c and ¼
Downstream merger
Consider now the case where the industry is characterized by two upstream¯rms serving a downstream producer. Since D directly faces the¯nal market, it does not face any credibility problem and manages to make a take-it or leave-it o®er to U and U imposing them to sell their input at the marginal cost c: This implies that D manages to sell the quantity that maximize its aggregate pro¯t:
Therefore, di®erently from an upstream merger, a downstream merger decreases the welfare of consumers and increases the pro¯ts of the merging¯rms, relative to the pre-merger situation. This con¯mrs the results obtained under price competition.
Observable contracts: How the analysis would change
In this section, we brie°y review the results that would arise in the game if¯rms could o®er observable vertical contracts. In the case of competing vertical chains, observability of contracts implies that an upstream (resp. downstream)¯rm which has the bargaining power can use the contract to its retailers (resp. supplier) as a pre-commitment device to strategically manipulate product market equilibria in a proftable way. As we shall see, the optimal contract will crucially depend on the type of strategic interaction in the market place (i.e. strategic complements or strategic substitutes), rather than whether the bargaining power is on upstream or downstream¯rms % .
Price competition
Consider¯rst the case where there are duopolistic vertical chains and the bargaining power is on upstream¯rms. If goods are strategic complements (a reasonable assumption if¯rms are competing in prices) and contracts are observable, the upstream¯rm i knows that increasing w i will shift the best reply function of the retailer upwards and to the right, which implies raising not only p i but also p j , given w j : Therefore, for any w j charged by upstream¯rm j, setting w i > c is a commitment to a best reply function with higher prices, that is, a commitment to soften downstream competition (see Figure  1a) . This e®ect explains why, when contracts are observable, it is optimal to set the wholesale price higher than the marginal cost. Since being vertically separated and adopting a two-part tari® allows to exploit this strategic role associated with the choice of the wholesale price, it is more pro¯table than being vertically integrated, which is equivalent to setting w i = c; F F i = 0 and maximizing directly (
Insert Figure 1 The same kind of strategic e®ect also arises when downstream¯rms have the bargaining power in the vertical chain and for the same intuition. The downstream¯rm's % We keep the analysis informal to save space and because these results are relatively well know. The main references here are: Bonanno and Vickers (1988), Rey and Stiglitz (1988) , Lin (1988) , Gal{Or (1991) . See also the survey by Irmen (1998) .
& It can be shown in this setting that linear pricing is more pro¯table than a two-part tari® when the loss in sales due to double marginalization is not relevant. This is the case when goods are close substitutes (Rey and Stiglitz (1995) and Gal{Or (1991)) or when industry demand is su±ciently inelastic (Irmen (1997) ). The further question of which contract would be chosen in a game in which¯rms choose in the¯rst stage whether to o®er a two-part tari® or a linear pricing has been addressed by Rey and Stiglitz (1995) , Gal{Or (1991) and Irmen (1997) adopting linear demands. The¯rst paper shows that franchise fees will always be the equilibrium outcome in the absence of retail¯xed costs. In the other two papers retailers incur a¯xed cost in addition to a franchise fee. Linear prices arise as the equilibrium contract when goods are very close substitutes or when industry demand is su±ciently inelastic.
optimal contract is to o®er the upstream¯rm a supplying contract under which the latter sells at a wholesale price higher than its marginal cost, but pays a slotting allowance (F F < 0) to the retailer (see Sha®er, 1991) .
At the equilibrium with two vertical chains, therefore, the price would be p FF , with p m > p FF > p b (see Figure 1b) .
If contracts were observable, the upstream monopolist could support the jointmaximization outcome in a subgame perfect equilibrium. Two-part tari®s su±ce: a vector of wholesale prices is su±cient to induce the desired vector of retail proces, whilē xed fees transfer the surplus ' . No lack of commitment e®ect arises here and an upstream merger would result in the upstream monopolist being able to fully exploit its monopoly position.
The same would happen with a downstream monopolist. It would make a take-itor-leave-it o®er where the wholesale price equals the marginal cost, and both upstream rms would accept it. The downstream monopolist would then set the monopoly price.
Quantity competition
Consider¯rst the case of vertical chains with the upstream¯rms having the bargaining power over the retailers. When market interaction gives rise to strategic substitutability, if contracts are observable each upstream¯rm's best strategy will be to set w i < c for any given w j ; so as to shift the own retailer's best reply function to the right (see Figure  2a ). Other things being equal, being more aggressive in the market place would induce the rival retailer to reduce its quantity and raise the own retailer's pro¯t. However, both upstream producers would have exactly the same incentives to strategically use the vertical contract, and the¯nal outcome would be higher equilibrium quantities and lower pro¯ts than in the case of vertical integration (see Figure 2b ).
If the bargaining power was on the downstream¯rms, they would have the same incentive to pre-commit by o®ering a contract to the supplier which makes them (credibly) more aggressive in the downstream competition.
Insert Figure 2 If contracts were observable, the upstream monopolist could easily sustain the monopolistic outcome, for istance making the following take-it-or-leave-it o®ers to D and D : Both downstream¯rms would accept this contract and they together would sell the quantity Q m at price p m : No lack of commitment e®ect arises here and an upstream merger would result in the upstream monopolist being able to fully exploit its monopoly position.
The same outcome would arise in the case where there is a downstream monopolist.
To conclude, if contracts were observable, then both upstream and downstream mergers are equally welfare detrimental, as they would allow the merging parties to fully enjoy their monopoly power.
As a way of summary, the following table illustrates all the results obtained in the di®erent cases analysed in this paper. 
